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ARTICLE� 
Predation� 
In discussions of animal rights, the 
issue of predation is usually raised as 
the basis for a reductio ad absurdum 
objection: 
(1) Suppose humans were 
obligated to alleviate avoidable 
animal suffering. 
(2) Animals suffer when 
they are preyed upon by other 
animals. 
(3) Therefore, humans 
would be obligated to prevent 
predation. 
(4) But such an obligation 
would be absurd. 
(5) Therefore, contrary to 
hypothesis, humans are not 
obligated to alleviate: avoidable 
animal sufferi ng. 
There are three ways in which this 
argument may be successfully count­
ered: 
I. Challenging the evaluation in 
(4), 
II. Challenging that (3) follows 
from (1) and (2), 
III. Challenging that (5) follows 
from (1) th rou g h (4) . 
I shall develop each of these response 
strategies in tu rn. But before doing 
so, I want to spend a moment dis­
cussing and dismissing some not 
uncommon, faulty responses to the 
predation reductio. 
One such reponse runs as follows: 
Moral. obligations are directed 
towa rd rational agents, who 
can inhibit or extend their 
activity in recognition of those 
obligations. But animals are 
not rational agents, or, at 
least, they are not sufficiently 
rational to recognize and 
respond to moral obligations. 
Therefore, _a moral obligation 
for humans to alleviate avoida­
ble animal suffering cannot 
entail an obligation for animals 
not to be predatory. 
Th is response attempts to follow the 
second strategy noted above. That 
is, it challenges the inference from 
(1) to (3) in th e predation reductio. 
The problem with this response is 
that it misinterprets (3). The con­
cl us ion reached in (3) is not that ani­
mats are obligated to stop being pred­
ators. (3) asserts that we are 
obligated to prevent predation. Con­
sequently, the inference from (1) to 
(3) does not even raise the issue of a 
moral obligation had by predatory ani­
mals which they should somehow rec­
ognize and observe. 
It might be countered that it does 
not make sense to conclude that we 
have an obligation to prevent animals 
from being predators unless they are 
obligated not to be predators. It 
would then follow that even if the 
inference from (1) to (3) does not 
involve an explicit claim that animals 
are subjects of moral obligation, it 
presumes that they are. 
Such a counter-argument would be 
mistaken. There is no conceptual 
problem with the idea that we} as 
moral agents, should be obligated to 
prevent others, who are not moral 
agents, from doing harm. We rou­
tinely apply this idea when we hold 
parents responsible for preventing 
their pre-moral children from doing 
harm. That a young child "does not 
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know any better" does not prevent us 
from having an obligation to stop 
him/her from tormenting the cat. So, 
that the cat does not know any better 
cannot prevent us from having an 
obligation to stop him/her from killing 
birds. Consequently, this attempt to 
defeat the inference from (1) to (3) 
fa iI s . 
A second faulty response to the 
predation reductio runs something like 
this: 
Since animals cannot be obli­
gated not to be predators, 
there is nothing wrong with 
their being predators. But we 
cannot be morally obligated to 
prevent predation, if the re is 
nothing wrong with it. 
This objection impl icitly cha Ilenges the 
moral significance of (2) in the preda­
tion reductio by presuming that the 
moral value of an action derives 
entirely from the agent's responding 
or not responding to moral rules. 
That presumption is mista ken. 
Consider once again the example of a 
young child tormenting a cat. The 
child may be too young to recognize 
and respond to humane moral obliga­
tions. However, while this may influ­
ence our evaluation of his/her charac­
ter and responsibility for his/her 
action s, it does not lead us to con­
elude that there is nothing wrong with 
his/her tormenting the cat. Torment­
ing cats remains a wrong, whether it 
is done by someone who "ought to 
know better" or by someone who 
"can't tell right from wrong." To 
take another example, if we determine 
that someone is criminally insane, 
i.e., is incapable of distinguishing 
right from wrong, this affects our 
evaluation of his/her responsibility for 
his/her actions and whether he/she 
deserves punishment for them. How­
ever, it does not read us to conclude 
that there was noth i ng wrong with 
those actions. That they were com­
mitted by the criminally insane does 
not make cases of unjustified homicide 
and forced sexual intercourse morally 
neutral; they are still cases of murder 
and rape. 
Being unable to distinguish right 
from wrong may leave the agent 
"innocent, t! in the sense of "not cul­
pable," but it does not leave his/her 
actions "innocent," in the sense of 
"bei ng neither right nor wrong. " 
Those actions may still be right or 
wrong; it is just that the agent can­
not recognize this. While Kantians 
are correct when they emphasize that 
actions done for different reasons may 
have different moral values, they are 
not correct when they conclude that 
the entire moral value of an action 
derives from the agent's wi II. There 
are agent-independent dimensions to 
our moral evaluations, such as those 
concerning the consequences of 
action s, as well as agent-dependent 
dimensions. 1 Consequently, there 
could be a wrong for us to right in 
predation, even if that wrong cannot 
be the animals' failure to fulfill their 
moral obligations. So, this second 
response to the predation reductio 
also fails. 
The last of the common but faulty 
responses we will consider runs as 
follows: 
In being predators, animals are 
just following their nature. We 
should respect the natural 
needs and impulses of others. 
Therefore, we should not 
interfere with predation. 
This t'esponse again challenges the 
moral significance of (2) in the preda­
tion reductio, this time by presuming 
that respecting nature has a higher 
priority among our moral values than 
does preventing suffering. 
At the very least, this presumption 
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is not obviously true. 2 One of the 
fundamental and pervasive functions 
of moral rules and education is to 
delimit and inhibit the ways in which 
native needs may be fu Ifi lied a nd nat­
ural impulses may be pursued. Espe­
cially when some of us "doing what 
comes naturallyll results in the suffer­
ing or death of others, the standard 
moral response is that here is an 
aspect or expression of human nature 
wh ich does not merit ou r respect. 
Examples of this would be our lack of 
moral respect for and many efforts to 
delimit and inhibit our tendencies to 
aggression and dominance. We may 
also note that we simply do not accept 
this third response when our pets or 
chil'dren are the intended victims of 
predators, as occasionally happens 
when we ventu re into thei r territory 
or when, by destroyi ng thei r habi­
tats, we leave them no other survival 
option than to ventu re into ou r com­
munities in search of prey. When it 
comes to ou r loved ones, we clea rly 
give higher priority to preventing 
suffering and death than to respecting 
natu re. 
Thus, this third response to the 
predation reductio assigns a priority 
to the natural which is not confirmed 
by common moral practice. While this 
does not invalidate the argument, it 
does show that such an argument has 
a heavy burden of proof to meet 
before it poses a serious challenge to 
the predation reductio. It also sug­
gests that this argument is disingenu­
ous, as are so many other "it's only 
natural" references in moral discus­
sions. When our interests or the 
interests of those we ca re for wi II be 
hurt, we do not recognize a moral 
obligation to "let nature take its 
cou rse," but when we do not want to 
be bothered with an obligation, "that's 
just the way the world works" pro­
vides a handy excu se. 
I shall now develop in turn each of 
the three response strategies noted at 
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the beginning of this paper. Each of 
these strategies provides an answer 
sufficient to defuse the predation 
reductio. The reason for taking time 
to deal with all three of them is that 
in addition to dealing with the preda­
tion issue, they provide opportunities 
for reflecting on g~neral questions 
concerning the logic of moral reason­
i ng. Each of these responses raises, 
and resolves in a different way, the 
question of the practical significance 
of the absurd in moral reasoning. 
I. Would an obligation to prevent 
predation be absu rd? 
Conjuring up a picture of militant 
animal rightists fanning out across 
land and sea to protect mice from 
snakes and owls, rabbits from hawks 
and foxes, fish from bears and 
sharks, and otherwise making the 
world safe for the small and the her­
bivorous can easily make an obligation 
to prevent predation appea r abs u rd. 
But appearances can be deceiving. 
What is commonly lost in the laugh of 
the predation reductio is that there 
are several different ways in which 
something can be absurd and that the 
legitimacy of the evaluation in (4) 
cannot be ascertained until we know 
just which of these forms of absurdity 
is being asserted. 
When philosophers (perhaps, oth­
ers, too) think of absurdity, the first 
th ing that comes to mi nd is logical 
absurdity. However, that certainly 
cannot be the sense of the term that 
is being employed in (4). That 
humans should attempt to prevent 
predation is not in a class with 
attempting to square the circle, make 
two plus two equal five, or have a 
sentence be both true and false at the 
same time and place and in the same 
way. The classic form of the reductio 
ad absurdum argument requires that 
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the conclusion entailed by the 
hypothesis in question contradict some 
basic principle of reasoning, such as 
the laws of geometry, a rithmetic, or 
logic. That humans ought to prevent 
predation does not violate any such 
law of reasoning and is, therefore, 
not logically absu rd. 
A more modern form of the reductio 
is the use of hypothetical-deductive 
reasoning to falsify scientific hypoth­
eses. In this sort of reductio, the 
conclusion entailed by the hypothesis 
must be contra ry to what is observed 
in fact. But (3) does not contain a 
factual claim, e. g. , about the exis­
tence of a legal statute obligating us 
to prevent predation. Rather, (3) 
contains an imperative directing us to 
undertake such prevention. Since (3) 
does not contain a factual claim, it 
ca nnot be contra ry to some matte r of 
fact. Consequently, (3) is not "fac­
tually absurd," either. 
Recent studies of the use of pa ra­
digms in science suggest yet another 
way in which a reductio may work. 
The proposed conclusion may contra­
dict some thorough Iy accepted theory, 
the principles of which seem much less 
questionable than the hypothesis from 
which the offending conclusion 
derives. Then, forced to choose 
between the thoroughly accepted 
theory and the more questionable 
hypothesis, we will feel justified in 
rejecting that hypothesis on the 
grounds that what it entails is "theo­
retically absurd." For example, if the 
conclusions of one's cosmological 
theorizing contradicted contemporary 
quantum mechanics, those conclusions 
would likely be considered unworthy 
of serious consideration and the bases 
for them be dismissed. This sort of 
absu rdity is like logical absu rdity, the 
difference being that here the princi­
ples contradicted may be substantive 
ones, whereas those contradicted in 
the fi rst case were strictly formal 
principles. 
In the case at hand, environmental 
ethicists who hold that "a thing is 
right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community, [and] it is wrong 
when it tends otherwise" 3 wou Id 
doubtless find an obligation to prevent 
predation to be theoretically absurd. 
However, such a n eva Iuation cou Id not 
be sustained, since the above envi­
ronmental principle does not enjoy 
anything like the wide acceptance that 
the basis for an evaluation of theoret­
ical absurdity must possess. Indeed, 
that environmental principle is so con­
trary to paradigm ethical principles, 
e.g., in giving intrinsic moral value 
to ina n imate objects, that it i·s much 
likely to be the object of a theoretical 
reductio than the basis for one. 
Of cou rse, I shall not even try to 
provide a complete su rvey of other 
possible bases for labelling an obliga­
tion to prevent predation theoretically 
absurd. I shall just note that the 
humane principle in (1) is very widely 
accepted today, even if just what fol­
lows from that principle is still a mat­
ter of considerable controversy. 
Usually; it is not the obligation in (1) 
but interpretations of "avoidable" and 
"suffering" within that obligation and 
questions about whether there are 
rights correlated with this obligation 
which are at issue. Consequently, it 
is highly doubtful that there is any 
moral theory wh ich is so much more 
thoroughly accepted than our obliga­
ti.on to alleviate avoidable animal suf­
fering that it cou Id serve as the basis 
for discrediting that humane obligation 
on the grounds that (3) contradicts 
that theory and is, therefore, theo­
retically absurd. Rather, if there is 
such a contrary theory, we would 
(initially, at least) be left in a condi­
tion of moral perplexity, with widely 
accepted principles entailing contrary 
obi igation s . So, even if (3) were to 
contradict the principles of some ethi­
cal theory, it would not "follow that it 
could properly be characterized as 
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"theoretically absurd." Principles of 
humane morality are probably too 
widely accepted nowadays to permit a 
theoretical reductio of them. 
Another way in which (3) might be 
absurd could be labelled "contextual 
absurdity.1! A conclusion is contextu­
ally absurd if it contradicts (the 
spirit of) one or more of its premises. 
It might be a rgued that what is 
absurd about (3) is that in attempting 
to prevent predation, we would cause 
much more suffering than we would 
prevent. Most obviously, we would 
have to frustrate predators and per­
haps even drive many of them to 
extinction (in the wild). Further­
more, we would have to control the 
population explosion among the former 
prey which our prevention of preda­
tion would occasion. This would 
require frustrating many of these ani­
mals, too, and would probably neces­
sitate subjecting some of them to the 
trauma of surgery to sterilize them. 
As to just how bleak the indirect 
consequences of eliminating predation 
might be, I will not quibble, because 
this sort of objection is easily and 
reasonably met by reformulating (3) 
as follows: 
(3') Therefore, humans would 
be obligated to prevent preda­
tion whenever doing so would 
not occasion as much or more 
suffering than it would pre­
vent. 
(3') does not represent a retreat from 
the moral stance being advocated in 
(1). (3') merely makes explicit how 
(3) must be interpreted, since (3) is 
to be a consequence of (1). (1) 
refers to alleviating animal suffering, 
and this would not be accomplished if 
preventi ng the sufferi ng caused by 
predation caused animals even greater 
suffering. Hence, only if (3) is 
interpreted as (3') does it validly fol­
low from (1) and (2). 
E&A V/2 
It might be countered that while 
(3') meets the contextual objection, it 
does so by postulating a vacuous obli­
gation, since there are no cases of 
predation which would fall under it. 
However, that is not true. (3') would 
immediately obligate us to prevent ou r 
pets from being predators. It would 
also obligate us to begin exploring 
other ways in which we could reudce 
the suffet~ing caused by predation 
without occasioning as much or more 
suffering, e.g., in zoos, wildlife pre­
serves, and other areas where we are 
already managing· animals. 
Th us, (3') contai n s a su bsta ntive 
obligation which is in the spirit of our 
obligation to alleviate avoidable animal 
suffering. Consequently; if contex­
tual absurdity is the claim in (4), it 
is unwarranted, and we can make this 
immediately clear by substituting (3') 
for (3). 
However, contextual absu rdity does 
suggest yet another way in which (3') 
might be absurd: "practical absurd­
ity." As Kant asserts, "ought implies 
can;" so, an obligation is practically 
absurd, if it commands us to do some­
thing we cannot do. Now, it really 
does seem inconceivable that we will 
ever be able to eliminate predation. 
Other than by eliminating carnivorous 
and omnivorous wildlife entirely, h9W 
are we to stop predators trom catch­
ing rodents in the highland valleys of 
the Rockies and big fish from eating 
little fish in the ocean depths? Only 
God can see--and could prevent--each 
sparrow's fall. 
Once again, this objection is not as 
serious as it appears to be. That a 
condition is one we cannot attain does 
not disqualify it from being a useful 
moral ideal. For example, Ch ristian 
ethics instructs us to follow Christ's 
example, even though we can never 
be as good as Christ, since He was 
divine ahd we are not. Similarly, 
Ka nt asserts that the ultimate 
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obligation in morality is to become a 
holy will, which is something we can 
never do, since we are not purely 
rational beings but have a sensuous 
nature, as well. Kant makes this 
situation practical by interpreting that 
ultimate moral obligation as an obliga­
tion for us to strive to approximate 
ever more closely to the unattainable 
ideal of being holy. 4 
Such examples indicate that what is 
requi red of a practical moral ideal is 
not that it be attainable but merely 
that it be something we can work 
toward. As noted in the discussion of 
contextual absurdity, this is a condi­
tion that the obligation to prevent' 
predation ca n meet. So, even if we 
cannot foresee ourselves being able to 
stop predation entirely, the obligation 
to prevent predation ca n sti II fu nction 
as a moral ideal guiding what we can 
do. Consequently, it is not practi­
cally absurd. 
This would seem to leave only the 
idea that (3') is absurd because it 
would direct humans to overstep their 
proper place in the world. It might 
be claimed that in even pursuing (3') 
as a moral ideal, we would be working 
toward attaining God-like control over 
nature, something which is not merely 
impractical but a false ideal for our 
moral endeavors. 
Basically, this sort of objection is 
nothing more than purple prose. 
Appeals to what is "natural and 
proper" have been pressed as objec­
tions to vi rtua Ily every mora lin nova­
tion from the Emancipation Proclama­
tion through women's suffrage to birth 
control. These past appeals to the 
naturally proper have proven to be 
nothing more than excuses for main­
taining the status quo or for promot­
ing personal preferences. There is 
no reason to believe that such appeals 
are anything but excuses in the dis­
cussion of our obligations to animals, 
either. 
Working toward preventi~g
predation would merely be an applica­
tion of a common human activity which 
is not ordinarily regarded as unnatu­
ral or an expression of the sin of 
pride. We routi nely interfere with 
nature to protect ourselves (and other 
animals, too) from such threats to life 
and limb as flooding rivers, diseases, 
erosion, storms, birth defects, infec­
tions, avalanches, pestilence, epidem­
ics, and decay. Interferi ng with 
nature in an attempt to make the 
world a happier, more fulfilling, less 
dangerous place to live is a part of 
being human. Admittedly, we have 
not always pursued this project suc­
cessfully or even wisely, but particu­
lar failures and stupidities do not 
demonstrate that the project itself is 
somehow unnatural, an offense against 
God, oran attempt by us to overstep 
"our assigned place" in the world 
(allowing, for the purposes of argu­
ment, that it even ma kes sense to use 
such a phrase). 
Since this sort of objection is often 
exp res sed in at least superficially 
religious terms and probably makes 
sense only in a religious context, 
some sort of appeal to religious 
authority would seem to be the most 
likely way of trying to support it. 
However, if we turn to Judeo-Chris­
tian scripture, we find that God gave 
humans dominion over the earth and 
all that live upon it. No matter how 
one interprets "dominion," from abso­
lute power to stewardship, it follows 
that God has, at the least, given us 
permission to manage nature. Fur­
thermore, since this scripture also 
claims that God is a creator and that 
humans have been created in His 
image, it wou Id seem to follow that in 
exercis ing ou r domin ion over the 
earth, we can be expected to re-cre­
ate it to some deg ree- -and that re­
creation is not limited by a command­
ment stati ng "Thou s ha,lt not inte rfe re 
with predation!" Judeo-Christian tra­
dition thus does not support the 
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contention that it would be improper 
for us to attempt to prevent preda­
tion. 
Of course, there are other scrip­
tures besides the Bible, but it would 
certainly be out of place even to 
attempt to survey them here. We may 
simply note that if there are conflict­
ing religious teachings on this issue, 
that fact, along with the notorious 
difficulties involved in trying to find 
rational grounds for choosing among 
competing religious traditions, is suf­
ficient to blunt the force of this 
objection to ou r having an obligation 
to prevent predation. Consequently, 
. it seems fa ir to concl ude that the 
charge that (3') is "unnaturally 
absurd" either is merely rhetorical, 
does not fit with common practice and 
draws unwarranted conclusions from 
our past failures, or is unwarranted 
by the religious context needed to 
make it at all sensible. Whichever the 
option, when interpreted as a charge 
of unnatural absurdity, (4) is left 
unwarranted. 
Thus, at the very least, it is not 
at all clear that the evaluation in (4) 
is warranted. Since a reductio ad 
absurdum argument relies on the 
absurdity of the proposed conclusion 
bei ng blatant, it follows that the p re­
dation reductio of human obligations to 
animals fails. 
Of the reasons just offered for this 
failure, perhaps the one with the 
greatest general import is that 
although something may be impractical 
as an immediate goal of ou r moral 
endeavors, that does not disqualify it 
from being a useful moral ideal guid­
ing what we can accomplish. The 
spectre of gross impracticality seems 
to be what underlies the feeling that 
there is something absurd in the idea 
of humans being obligated to prevent 
predation. Recognizing that an unat­
tainable condition may still serve as a 
useful guiding ideal for what is at-
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tainable disperses this spectre by 
giving practical import to the unattai­
nable and showing that an obligation 
is not absurd just because it com­
mands us to pursue what we cannot 
attain. 
II. Would an obligation to prevent 
avoidable animal suffering entail an 
obligation to prevent predation? 
Through the years, moral philoso­
phers have agreed with Aristotle that 
ethics is "a practical science," but 
just what is involved in a science 
being a practical' one is not well-es­
tablished. A classical ideal, exempli­
fied in Plato's Republic and Spinoza's 
Ethics, is that reason functions in 
fundamentally the same way in all 
areas, with only the subject matters 
and the conclusions being different, 
the conclusion of theoretical reasoning 
being knowledge, while the conclusion 
of practical reasoning is action. On 
the other hand, contemporary, non­
cognitivist meta-ethical theories point 
toward fundamental differences in the 
operations of reason in practical and 
theoretical endeavours. I find the 
non-cognitivist analysis more credible 
than the classical ideal, and what I 
want to suggest here is that there is 
a rule for practical reasoning which 
renders one kind of reductio invalid 
in practical contexts, even thoug h 
that kind of argument does not violate 
the general rules of logic. The effect 
of this rule will be to render a certain 
critical strategy fallacious in practical 
contexts, such as ethics. 
This rule is suggested by a recent 
response to one of the standa rd criti­
cisms of utilitarianism. That criticism 
of utilitarianism has taken the form of 
imagining some Brave New World which 
seems to fulfill the principle of utility 
but which is intuitively unacceptable. 
This is supposed to provide a reductio 
of utilitarianism. For example, envi­
ronmental eth icists have criticized 
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utilitarianism on the grounds that if 
we were capable of replaci ng natu re 
withapIastic envi ro nmen t whic h 9 ave 
as much happiness as the natural one 
to all sentient beings involved (some­
thing we are not even near being able 
to do), then the principle of utility 
cou Id not generate a n obligation for 
us to favor the natural environment 
over the plastic one. A recent line of 
response to this sort of criticism has 
been to deny the relevance of such 
imaginative constructions by arguing 
that since utilitarianism is a moral 
philosophy for working with the prob­
lems of the world in which we actually 
live, it must be evaluated on the basis 
of how it in st ructs us to dea I with 
real, not imaginary, problems and 
possibilities. s Thus, this defense of 
utilitarianism undercuts a line of criti­
cism by emphasizing the practicality of 
ethics, and this takes the form of 
confining the domain of inference from 
the principle of utility to matters of 
contemporary concern and possible 
response. 
I find this defense of utilitarianism 
thoroughly appropriate, since I find 
science fiction and "worst conceivable 
case" criticisms of ethical principles to 
miss the point of doing ethics, a 
practical science, altogether. I want 
to suggest here a Kantian analogue to 
this defense of utilitarianism. What I 
propose is that "ought implies can" be 
interpreted as a rule for practical 
reasoning, and I offer the following as 
a formu lation of that ru Ie: 
An argument of the form "P, 
Q, R, .. Y /Therefore 5 
ought to z" is val id only if "5 
can z" is true. 6 
Just how "can" is to be interpreted 
and just how we are to determine 
whether "s can z" is true, shall 
leave at the intuitive level. Detailed 
responses to these issues would likely 
require different answers for different 
cases, e.g., cases involving specific 
imperatives vs. those involving gen­
eral imperatives, would also have to 
grapple with the issue of "can attain" 
vs. "can work toward," and, fortu­
nately, are not necessary to deal with 
the issue at hand, the. predation 
reductio. 
In the previous section, we dis­
cussed several different kinds of 
reductios, d ifferentiati ng them on the 
basis of the way in which the pro­
posed conclusion is supposed to be 
absurd. The above rule for practical 
reason ing does not affect most of 
those ki nds of reductios, but it does 
affect those of the form: 
If P were true, S would be 
obligated to do something he/ 
she cannot do, which is 
absurd. 
According to the above rule, this 
practical reductio does not discredit 
P. Rather, the inference from P to 
liS ought to z" is invalid precisely 
because "s can z" is false. That is, 
in a practical science, i.e., one which 
(among other things) adopts the above 
rule of reasoning, the practical 
reductio is not an available line of 
criticism. This is because in a prac­
tical science, it is not the case that 
inferences to impractical obligations 
are valid but unsound, as they would 
have to be for a legitimate reductio. 
Rather, . such inferences are simply 
invalid. 7 
Of course, this conclusion depends 
on the above rule (or something very 
much like it) being acceptable, and 
while having special rules of inference 
for limited domains of reasoning is 
unproblematic, it might be objected 
that a rule of reasoning which bases 
the validity of an inference on some­
thing being true confuses logical with 
factual issues. From the viewpoint of 
theoretical reason i ng, such a criticism 
might be well-taken, but if one's con­
cern is practical, then keeping 
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inferences in touch with the facts of 
the world is not confusion but reason­
ableness. Limiting our concern to 
real problems and possibilities is at 
least an important part of what it 
means to be "practical," and what the 
above rule for practical reasoning 
does is to make a logical contribution 
to specifying that practical attitude. 
Consequently, it would be a category 
mistake to criticize that rule for not 
employing the distinction between log­
ical and factual issues employed in 
admittedly non -practical contexts. 8 
Retu rn ing to the predation reduc­
tio, the analysis of the previous sec­
tion indicates that if (3') is absurd, it 
is because it contains an obligation we 
cannot fulfill. Consequently, if the 
predation reductio is to succeed, it 
must be as a practical reductio, 
rather than as a logical reductio, fac­
tual reductio, etc. But since this is 
an ethical issue, the rules of practical 
reasoning apply, including the pro­
hi b ition agai nst imp racti ca I. infe rences . 
Consequently, if (3') is impractical, 
(1) and (2) do not entail (3'). That 
is, if we cannot prevent predation, 
the above rule for practical reasoning 
tells us that our obligation to alleviate 
,avoidable animal suffering cannot 
entail an obligation to prevent preda­
tion. Thus, the predation reductio is 
fallacious. The very thing that was 
supposed to render (3') absurd actu­
ally renders the inference from (1) 
and (2) to (3') invalid. 
Of course, the analysis of the pre­
vious section indicates that an obliga­
tion to prevent predation wou Id not be 
impractical, even though completely 
eliminating predation might be impos­
sible. So, the above rule for practi­
cal reasoning may not be necessary to 
save ou r obligation to alleviate avoida­
ble animal suffering from the preda­
tion reductio. . Nonetheless, I th ink 
the analysis of this section is espe­
cially important, not only as a back­
stop, should some flaw be found in 
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our handling of practicality in the 
fi rst section, but also because the 
practical ru Ie of inference developed 
here expresses the proper role for 
practical absurdity in ethics. Imprac­
tical inferences do not discredit ethi­
cal principles; such inferences mark 
the boundaries of ethical concern. We 
shall develop this idea further in the 
next section. 
III. If an obligation to alleviate avoi­
dable animal suffering entailed an 
obi igation to prevent predation and if 
the latter obligation would be absurd, 
would it follow that we are not obli­
gated to alleviate avoidable animal 
suffering? 
When we find that· a hypothesis 
leads to an unacceptable conclusion, 
we need not simply infer that the 
hypothesis is also unacceptable. 
Rather, the conclusion may be used as 
a guide for discovering what is wrong 
with the hypothesis, how we should 
interpret the hypothesis, how we 
might revise the hypothesis, or what 
is and what is not covered by that 
hypothesis. If, in spite of the analy­
ses of the previous sections, we 
accept (1) through (4) in the preda­
tion reductio, that argument falls 
under the last of these options. That 
is, rather than discrediting (1), the 
predation reductio helps show us what 
is and what is not covered by ou r 
obligation to alleviate avoidable animal 
suffering. 
In the fi rst section, we discovered 
that (4) is ambiguous and that the 
only substantive interpretation of it 
would be more clearly formulated as 
follows: 
(4') That we ought to prevent 
predation would be an imprac­
tical obligation. 
(4') clearly indicates that what is 
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(supposedly) absurd about the obliga­
tion in (3') is that it is beyond our 
power to fulfill that obligation. But if 
we ca nnot prevent predation, -it fol­
lows that the suffering of animals who 
are preyed upon by other animals is 
not avoidable suffering and, there­
fore, is not covered by ou r obligation 
to alleviate avoidable animal suffering. 
Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn 
from (1) through (4') is not (5) but 
the following: 
(5') Therefore, animal suffer­
ing due to predation is not 
included among the cases of 
animal suffering which humans 
are obligated to alleviate. 
Saying that predation is unavoida­
ble may strike some as being as sim­
plistic and self-serving as saying that 
eating meat is necessary for human 
health and happiness. However, while 
predation that is avoidable, e. g. , 
predation by our pets, may escape the 
argument of the preceding paragraph, 
it will not help salvage the predation 
reductio. Any predation that is avoi­
dable in the sense at issue here, 
namely, "preventable by humans," is 
not something it would be practically 
absu!rd for us to be obligated to pre­
vent. Therefore, predation covered 
by (1) is not covered by (4'). So, in 
every case, either the predation is 
not covered by (1), or it is not cov­
ered: by (4'). Consequently, in no 
case can (1) through (4') justify 
(5).~
Of course, the point still remains 
that not all predation is unavoidable. 
But we now know the practical con-
elusion to be drawn from th is: 
Where we can prevent preda­
tion without occasioning as 
much or more suffering than 
we would prevent, we are obli­
gated to do so by the principle 
that we are obligated to allevi­
ate avoidable animal suffering. 
Where we cannot prevent 
predation or ca n not do· so 
without occasioning as much or 
more suffering than we would 
prevent, that principle does 
not obi igate us to attempt to 
prevent predation. 10 
While that is the specific moral of 
this story, the general moral that 
runs through all three of the above 
analyses is that while a concern with 
practicality is certainly relevant in 
ethical disputations, exactly how the 
issue of practicality figures into ethi­
cal deliberations is not immediately 
obvious and is in need of careful 
reflection and clarification. Such 
clarification may involve carefully dif­
ferentiating the ways in which differ­
ent elements of ou r moral theories 
work, e.g., differentiating unattaina­
ble moral ideals from attainable moral 
goals, as was done in section I. Or 
it may involve recognizing that there 
are rules for practical reasoning not 
found in theoretical reasoning, such 
as the rule discussed in section II. 
Or it may involve clarifying a!T!bigui­
ties in key terms related to practical­
ity, as was done with "avoidable" in 
section III. Whichever of these pro­
cedures is followed, the issue of 
practicality will be treated as a guide 
for moral concern, rather than as an 
occasion for ridiculing that concern. 
Steve F. Sapontzis 
California State University, Hayward 
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Notes 
1 . For an extended discussion of 
this point, see my "Moral Value and 
Reason," The Monist 66/1 (1983), pp. 
146-159. 
2. Critically discussing arguments 
concerning what is due the natural is 
made difficult by the strong, positive 
evaluative meaning of "natural" in its 
opposition to "artificial," "distorted," 
"disguised," "polluted," and other 
such terms. But, of course, to the 
degree that an argument trades on 
that evaluative meaning of the term, it 
begs the question of the respect due 
the "natural," in the sense of the 
term which is descriptive and refers 
to the native, instinctual, biological, 
unmanufactured, etc. 
3. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County 
Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1949), pp. 224-225. 
4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Practical Reason, Book II, Chapter II, 
Part IV. 
5. R. M. Ha re develops th is sort 
of defense of utilitarianism in "Ethical 
Theory and Utilitarianism," in Con­
temporary British Philosophy, volume 
4, ed. H. D. Lewis (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1976). 
6. I suspect that logically speci­
fying "ought implies can" as a princi­
ple of practical reasoning would 
require elaborating a whole family of 
rules for practical reasoning. For 
example, in addition to the above 
inference rule, there must also be a 
selection rule 'like '''s ought to z' is a 
basic moral principle only if'S can z' 
'is true." Fortunately, it is not nec­
essary to produce the entire family in 
order to deal with the predation 
reductio. 
7. Since it is doubtful that a 
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practical reductio would be of any use 
ina non - p racti ca I context, it follows 
that the practical reductio is probably 
an altogether worthless form of criti­
cism. 
8. We may also note that basing 
the validity of inferences on factual 
considerations is not unheard of even 
in the theoretical sciences. The most 
obvious example of this is the "exis­
tential hypothesis" that "There exists 
at least one member of S" is true, 
which is required if the immediate 
inference from "All S are P" to "Some 
S are P" is to be valid. Perhaps 
Aristotle's presumption of the existen­
tial hypothesis is a testimony to his 
belief that even logic should be prac­
tical. 
9. In line with the discussion of 
contextual absurdity in the first sec­
tion, it might be a rgued that "avoida­
ble" in (1) should be interpreted as 
"preventable by humans without occa­
sioning equal or greater suffering." 
This interpretation would support the 
point being made here just as well as 
the shorter interpretation just dis­
cussed. Using the expanded inter­
pretation of "avoidable" wou Id requ ire 
that we interpret (4) as follows: 
(4 11 ) That we ought to pre­
vent predation would be an 
obligation to occasion as much 
or more suffering as we would 
prevent. 
It follows that any case of preda­
tion covered by (1) would not be cov­
ered by (4") and vice versa. So, (1) 
(4 11through ) could not support (5) 
any more than can (1) through (4'). 
10. Once such an obligation is 
acknowledged, further issues must be 
considered in determining how much 
and what sort of effort should be 
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devoted to fulfilling it. Among these 
issues is whether we will do more 
good by attempting to fulfill this obli­-
gation or by seeking to alleviate other 
forms of avoidable animal suffering. 
Other than by preventing predation 
by anima Isunde r 0 u r co nt roI, e. g . , 
pets, it seems likely that for the for­-
seeable future, animal rights activists 
will do better by directing their 
organized efforts on behalf of animals 
toward alleviating the suffering 
humans cause animals than by 
attempti ng to prevent predation among 
animals. Perhaps this question of 
where one can do the most good is the 
most substantive question concern ing 
the practicality of an obligation to 
prevent predation. 
